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I. INTRODUCTION

Abu Ghraib is one of the world's most notorious prisons.2 Under
Saddam Hussein, it was the sight of atrocious acts of torture, weekly
executions, and inhumane living conditions.3 When coalition forces moved
in after the fall of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, they repaired the old
prison and added a medical center so that it could be used as a United
States military prison.4 Shockingly, in April 2004, CBS aired grotesque
pictures of abuse of Iraqi prisoners at the hands of United States soldiers
at Abu Ghraib. 5 Some pictures showed naked Iraqi prisoners piled on top
of one another and forced to simulate sexual acts while American soldiers
stood in the background smiling.6 In June of 2004, with these shocking
pictures still fresh in American minds, The Washington Post released an
August 1, 2002 memorandum (the Torture Memo) 7 that had been
2. SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND 20 (2004).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 21.
5. Id. at 22-23. This was not the only recent incident of abuse of prisoners by American
soldiers. In December 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved a series of harsh
questioning methods for use at the Guantanamo Bayprison. Editorial, TorturePolicy, WASH. POST,
June 16,2004, at A26. These methods included removing clothing, using stress positions, hooding,
using dogs to induce fear, and inflicting mild noninjurious physical conduct. Id. A national
guardsman who was undercover as a prisoner at Guantanamo went public in 2004 with allegations
of abuse. Associated Press, U.S. Military Details 8 Guantanamo Abuse Cases (Nov. 5, 2004),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6413220. He described an attack in November 2002 where the
"extraction team" removed him from his cell and repeatedly slammed his head against the steel
floor. Id. As a result of the abuse, the guardsman suffered brain injuries and seizures. Id. Other
abuses have been reported from Guantanamo:
A detainee was forced to kneel so many times he was bruised, a barber gave
reverse mohawks and a female interrogator ran her fingers through a prisoner's
hair and sat in his lap, the U.S. government says in the most detailed accounting
of eight abuse cases at its Guantanamo Bay prison for terror suspects.
Id.
6. HERSH, supra note 2, at 22-23.
7. Dana Priest, Justice Dept. Memo Says Torture "May Be Justified ' (June 13, 2004),
See generally
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38894-2004Jun13.html.
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1,2002) [hereinafter Torture
Memo] (discussing the application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340(A) (2000)). The Torture Memo is
not the only recent controversial memo from the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel.
A January 22, 2002 memo, for example, argued that the Geneva Convention does not apply to
enemy combatants. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General
Counsel, Department of Defense (Jan. 22, 2002) (discussing the application of treaties and laws to
al Qaeda and Taliban detainees). However, this Note will not explore any memos other than the
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principally drafted by John Yoo,8 signed by former Assistant Attorney
General Jay S. Bybee,9 and addressed to Alberto Gonzales, the President's
legal counsel.' The authors of the Torture Memo argued that torture may
be justified if done pursuant to the President's power as Commander in
Chief."
The Torture Memo was a response by the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC)' 2 to a CIA request for legal advice regarding standards of conduct
for interrogation.' 3 In the Torture Memo, the OLC first argued that

Torture Memo.
8. R. Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Groundsfor Torture Memos, WASH. POST, July 4,2004, at
A12. John Choon Yoo is currently a member of the faculty at Boalt Hall School of Law, University
of California, Berkeley. Boalt Hall, John Choon Yoo Faculty Profile, available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/profiles/facultyProfile.php?faclD=235. At the time of drafting
the Torture Memo, Yoo was Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice Office
of Legal Counsel. Id.
9. Torture Memo, supra note 7, at 46. George W. Bush appointed Jay S. Bybee to be
Assistant Attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice in the Office of Legal Counsel in 2001. U.S.
Department of Justice Office of Legal Policy, Jay S. Bybee Biography, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/bybeebio.htm (last visited May 5, 2005). It was in his role as Assistant
Attorney General that Bybee signed the Torture Memo. See Torture Memo, supra note 7, at 46.
Bush then appointed Bybee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on January 7, 2003,
and the Senate confirmed Bybee on March 13, 2003. Judges of the United States Courts, Biography
of Jay S. Bybee, at http://air.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetlnfo?jid=2981 (last visited May 5, 2005).
10. Torture Memo, supranote 7, at 1. At the time this Note was written, Alberto Gonzales
was being considered for the position of Attorney General. Senate Judiciary Committee,
Confirmation Hearings for Alberto Gonzales, Jan. 6, 2005 [testimony of Senator Specter]. On
January 6, 2005, Gonzales appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee for a confirmation
hearing. Id. At the time that the Torture Memo was written, Gonzales was Counsel for President
George W. Bush. See id. Before joining Bush in the White House, Gonzales was Bush's attorney
while Bush was Governor of Texas and then served as a judge on the Supreme Court of Texas. Id.
11. Torture Memo, supra note 7, at 2.
12. The OLC website states:
The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel
assists the Attorney General in his function as legal advisor to the President and
all the executive branch agencies. The Office drafts legal opinions of the Attorney
General and also provides its own written opinions and oral advice in response to
requests from the Counsel to the President, the various agencies of the executive
branch, and offices within the Department. Such requests typically deal with legal
issues of particular complexity and importance or about which two or more
agencies are in disagreement. The Office also is responsible for providing legal
advice to the executive branch on all constitutional questions and reviewing
pending legislation for constitutionality.
United States Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, About OLC, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/ (last visited May 5, 2005).
13. Dana Priest et al., JusticeDepartmentMemo Said..., WASH. POST, June 13,2004, at A3.
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although 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 14 criminalize torture, those sections do
not prohibit cruel and inhumane treatment.' 5 The OLC then argued for a
very narrow definition of torture, which includes only the most extreme
acts that are specifically intended to inflict severe mental or physical pain
and suffering. 6 Furthermore, according to the OLC, even if interrogation
techniques were found to constitute torture, the rules proscribing torture
would be unconstitutional as infringing on the President's inherent
powers. 7 Finally, the OLC argued that if all else failed, the President8
could claim either self-defense or necessity to justify the use of torture.
When The Washington Post published the Torture Memo on June 13,
2004,"9 the OLC's narrow definition of torture shocked the consciences of
people around the world and incited much criticism.2" The Torture Memo
shocked many lawyers in particular, not only because of the narrow
definition of torture but also because of its broad interpretation of

14. Section 2340 defines torture as "an act committed by a person acting under the color of
law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical
control." 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2000). Section 2340A makes it a crime to commit torture and
provides punishments that vary from a fine to death depending on the severity of the torture. Id.
§ 2340A(a).
15. Torture Memo, supra note 7, at 1.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id. Although this Note does not deal with the OLC's advice on self-defense, it is an
interesting topic for another day. The OLC prospectively advised its client on the possibility of
claiming self-defense retrospectively. The OLC's advice raises the question of whether there is a
difference between the ethical standards that apply to prospective advice and those that apply to
retrospective advice. In Ethical Abuse the author described the difference between prospective
advice and retrospective advice. Ethical Abuse, supra note 1, at 1084-85. The Note proposes a
hypothetical situation where a client wants to keep a secret on the stand and the lawyer advises him
to answer in a way that is misleading by negative implication. Id. at 1082-83. The author notes that
if the client follows this advice he would not be committing perjury, but the author initially inquires
whether the lawyer's advice is ethical. Id. at 1083. The author describes several approaches for
analyzing this hypothetical situation, including the Pure Client Model, whereby the lawyer's only
concern is zealously advocating on his client's behalf, id. at 1086-88, and the Libertarian Model,
whereby the client must know the relevant legal parameters prospectively in order to make full use
of his liberty. Id. at 1088-89. The author concludes that lawyers should operate under the same
ethical rules in giving both prospective and retrospective advice. Id. at 1099. Nevertheless,
prospective advice that encourages a client to engage in criminal activity by explaining how to
avoid conviction is arguably subject to different ethical norms than is a retrospective defense on
the same basis. See id. at 1088.
19. Priest, supra note 7.
20. E.g., Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Memo on Torture Draws Focus to Bush, WASH. POST,
June 9,2004, at A03; Smith, supranote 8; Julie Hilden, Dida Government Lawyer "AidandAbet"
Possible War Crimes? (June 8,2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/08/hilden.torture (last
visited May 5, 2005); Lawyers' Statement on Bush Administration's Torture Memos, availableat
http://www.afj.org/spotlight/0804statement.pdf [hereinafter Lawyers' Statement].
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presidential powers." There certainly are different views on the extent of
presidential powers, but many have argued that the view expressed in the
Torture Memo is one held by only a minority of legal scholars.22
Considering the public outrage that ensued after The Washington Post
published the Torture Memo, it is not surprising that the OLC withdrew
the Torture Memo in June 2004.23 On December 30,2004, the OLC issued
a memorandum (the Replacement Memo) to replace the Torture Memo.24
In the Replacement Memo, the OLC defined torture much more broadly
than it did in the Torture Memo and concluded that it was unnecessary to
address issues of presidential powers because the President had
unequivocally
stated that the United States would not participate in
2
torture.
Although the Torture Memo is no longer in effect, it remains necessary
to contemplate its ramifications and the responsibility of its authors. As
130 lawyers wrote in their statement on the Torture Memo, "[t]he belated
repudiation of the August 2002 memorandum ... is welcome, but the
repudiation does not undo the abuses that this memorandum may have
sanctioned or encouraged during the nearly two years that it was in effect.
The subsequent repudiation, coming after public outcry, confirms its
original lawless character., 26 Therefore, this Note will examine the
professional responsibility of the authors of the Torture Memo at the time
of its writing.
While lawyers holding a minority viewpoint are free to express their
opinions and are even free to argue their theories in defense of their clients

21. Smith, supranote 8; Lawyers' Statement, supra note 20. In the Lawyers' Statement, the
lawyers argued:
One of the surprising features of these legal memoranda is their failure to
acknowledge the numerous sources of law that contradict their own positions,
such as the Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952). The unprecedented and under-analyzed claim that the Executive
Branch is a law unto itself is incompatible with the rule of law and the principle
that no one is above the law.
Lawyers' Statement, supra note 20.
22. Smith, supranote 8 ("If you line up 1,000 law professors, only six or seven would sign
up to [the Torture Memo's minority viewpoint].") (quoting David B. Rivkin Jr., a White House
lawyer during the Reagan administration).
23. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to
James B. Comey, DeputyAttorney General, 2 (Dec. 30,2004) (regarding legal standards applicable
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A).
24. Id.at 1.
25. Id. at 1-2.
26. Lawyers' Statement, supra note 20.
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(so long as it has some basis in law and fact), 27 the OLC's arguably onesided Torture Memo sparked controversy. 28 The memo appeared to be
more a piece of persuasive advocacy than a thoughtful consideration of the
arguments. 29 This type of prospective advocacy raises several ethical
issues, many of which may require answers too speculative to resolve in
this Note. First, was the OLC's advice on the breadth of presidential
powers in clear contradiction to the governing law? Second, did the OLC
intend to "cover" the actions of the President? In other words, by telling
the President that he has broad powers and that torture is defined narrowly,
was the OLC effectively providing him with the defense of reliance on the
advice of counsel?3" Third, by the very act of writing the Torture Memo,

27. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002); Allen & Priest, supranote 20 ("'A
lawyer is permitted to craft all sorts of wily arguments about why a statute doesn't apply' to a
defendant .... 'But a lawyer cannot advocate committing a criminal act prospectively."') (quoting
Scott Norton, Chairman of the International Law Committee of the New York City Bar
Association). In fact, government lawyers already have begun crafting these "wily arguments." In
Comollari v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2004), the government lawyer argued for a narrow
definition of torture, claiming that a sniper who shoots someone so as to cause his victim's
immediate death has not tortured his victim while a sniper who shoots his victim in an artery and
thereby causes him to slowly bleed to death has committed torture. Id. at 697; see Noah Leavitt,
GovernmentRedefining Torture(Aug. 25, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/25/leavitt.
torture (last visited May 5, 2005) (citing the Government's argument in Comollari).
28. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
29. For example, the OLC wrote:
In light of the President's complete authority over the conduct of war, without
a clear statement otherwise, we will not read a criminal statute as infringing on the
President's ultimate authority in these areas....

In order to respect the President's inherent constitutional authority to manage
a military campaign against al Qaeda and its allies, Section 2340A must be
construed as not applying to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his
Commander-in-Chief authority.
Torture Memo, supranote 7, at 34.
30. The memo itself suggests this as a defense. See id. at 8 (citing Ratzlaf v. United States,
510 U.S. 135, 142 n.10 (1994)). The OLC wrote:
A defendant could negate a showing of specific intent to cause severe mental
pain or suffering by showing that he had acted in good faith that his conduct
A defendant could
would not amount to the acts prohibited by the statute ....
show that he acted in good faith by taking such steps as surveying professional
literature, consulting with experts, or reviewing evidence gained from past
experience.
Id. (citing Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 142 n.10 (1994)). The Court inRatzlafnoted that
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did the OLC intend to provide the President with an opinion akin to
binding legal precedent that would guarantee adherence to the torture
policy by the entire federal government?31 Finally, if the answer to any of
these questions is "yes," did the OLC lawyers assist or counsel their client
in conduct that the lawyers knew to be criminal or fraudulent in violation
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the Model Rules)?32
All of these issues cannot entirely be resolved in this Note because they
involve questions of intent that would be difficult to prove even in a
courtroom. Nevertheless, this Note will discuss each of these issues to
explore the potential extent of the ethical violations involved in the writing
of the Torture Memo. More broadly, this Note attempts to address both the
conflicting ethical concerns that exist for all lawyers and, in particular,
some of the special ethical concerns facing lawyers in the OLC. While
other articles have examined the OLC Torture Memo from a moral
perspective,33 this Note focuses on the professional responsibility of the
lawyers as specifically mandated by the Model Rules.
Part 1I will briefly describe the role of the OLC and the oftenconflicting duties that arise therein. To provide a background for analyzing
the advice in the Torture Memo, Part Il will discuss the existing law that
defines the scope of presidential powers. Part IV will describe in more
detail the advice given in the Torture Memo regarding the scope of
presidential powers. Part V will describe the relevant provisions of the
Model Rules and the corresponding case law. Part VI will analyze the
advice given by the OLC regarding presidential powers through the lens
of the lawyers' responsibilities under the Model Rules.34 Finally, Part VII
will offer possible solutions to the professional responsibility dilemma
demonstrated in the Torture Memo.

where a statute requires proof of specific intent, that element "might be negated by, e.g., proof that
defendant relied in good faith on advice of counsel." Ratzlaf,510 U.S. at 142 n. 10.
31. See Priest, supra note 7 ("Bybee's signature gives the document additional authority,
making it akin to a binding legal opinion on government policy on interrogations.").
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).

33. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Tortured Ethics: Abu Ghraib and the Moral Lawyer
(unpublished manuscript, at http://www.mirrorofjustice.com/mirrorofjustice/vischer/
torturedethics.pdf).
34. This Note does not, however, imply that the President actually did commit a crime. It is
not necessary to find that a crime actually occurred in order to show that a lawyer counseled or
assisted the client in criminal or fraudulent conduct. Werme's Case, 839 A.2d 1, 2 (N.H. 2003)
(reasoning that where the lawyer had counseled her client to break the law in violation of New
Hampshire Rules of Professional Responsibility 1.2(d), it was irrelevant whether or not her client
actually committed the crime).
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II. THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

As an initial matter, it may be helpful to understand the role of the
Office of Legal Counsel. While this is a complicated issue that has
received much scholarly attention, this Note will address it only briefly to
provide a general understanding of the professional responsibility
implications arising from that role. Although few people have heard of the
OLC, its influence is nonetheless significant.35 An OLC opinion serves two
purposes: 1) it advises the President on the law; and 2) it acts as binding
legal precedent on the entire executive branch.36
Congress has given the Attorney General the authority to give opinions
on questions of law when requested by the President and other officials of
executive departments.37 The Attorney General has delegated much of this
authority to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the OLC.3 8 The
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the OLC, therefore, helps the
Attorney General in his role as advisor to the President.3 9 The OLC drafts
opinions on behalf of the Attorney General in response to requests from
the Counsel to the President and other executive agencies.40
It is worth noting that the Attorney General is a part of the executive
branch and is thus a direct subordinate of the President.4 ' Because the
Attorney General is head of the OLC, the President controls both the
Attorney General and the OLC. At the same time, however, the OLC
opinions are binding on the executive branch, which includes the
Department ofJustice. Therefore, the OLC has two roles that occassionally
may conflict.
The Attorney General's role has recently been of interest due to the
confirmation hearings for Alberto Gonzales, former counsel for the
President. In his confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Gonzales said:

35. Fall Meeting DinnerHonors Office of Legal Counsel, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS (ABA,
D.C.), Winter 1998 ("To most ofthe legal world, the Office of Legal Counsel is an unknown entity.
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist, one of the former Assistant Attorneys General honored at the
dinner, commented that, when he was called by the Attorney General and offered the job, he asked
what the office did; he had never heard of it. Its relative obscurity, however, is at odds with its
importance."), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/news/vol23no2/ochist.html.
36. RandolfD. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation:A Perspectivefrom the Office
of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1303, 1305 (2000).
37. 28 U.S.C. §§ 511-513 (2000).
38. Id.§510.
39. See supra note 12.
40. See supra note 12.
41. Samuel Dash, Independent Counsel: No More, No Less a FederalProsecutor,86 GEO.
L.J. 2077, 2077 (1998).
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If confirmed as Attorney General, I will no longer
represent only the White House, I will represent the United
States of America and its people. I understand the differences
between the two roles. In the former, I have been privileged
to advise the President and his staff. In the latter, I would
have a far broader responsibility: to pursue justice for all the
people of our great nation; to see that the laws are enforced in
a fair and impartial manner for all Americans.42
While this role seems clear enough, the Torture Memo demonstrates that
it is not always so simple. During Gonzales's confirmation hearings,
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont expressed his concern regarding the
role of the Attorney General. He said:
When he was designated for this position by the President,
Judge Gonzales said that he was looking forward to, in his
words, "continuing to work with friends and colleagues in the
White House in a different capacity on behalf of our
President."
But there may be times when the Attorney General of the
United States has to enforce the law and cannot be worried
about friends, colleagues and benefactors at the White House.

...The job of attorney general is not about crafting
rationalizations for ill-conceived ideas. It is a much more
vital role than that. It is about being a forceful, independent
voice in our continuing quest for justice and in defense of the
constitutional rights of each and every American.4 3
Although most seem to agree that the role of Attorney General, and
thus the OLC, should be characterized by independence, the text of the
Torture Memo demonstrates that this is not always the case.'
42. HearingBefore the Senate JudiciaryComm. on the Nomination ofThe HonorableAlberto
R. Gonzales,to Be the Attorney Generalof the UnitedStates, 109th Cong. (Jan. 6, 2005), available
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfin?id= 1345&witid=3936 (statement of Alberto R.
Gonzales).
43. Id. (testimony of Senator Patrick Leahy).
44. Senator Leahy said:
We have now seen what happens when the rule of law plays second fiddle to
a President's policy agenda. With John Ashcroft as Attorney General and with a
White House Counsel's office that has impulsively facilitated rather than
cautiously vetted serious constitutional issues, the Administration has taken one
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II. PRESIDENTIAL POWERS DEFINED

Article II of the United States Constitution defines the scope of
Presidential powers.45 It begins by vesting executive power in the
President and then continues by enumerating the specific powers of the
President.46 The language of Article II, however, is far from clear and
leaves open the question of whether the President's powers are solely
limited to those enumerated in Article II. Some have argued that because
Article V4 limits congressional power to those powers "herein granted,"
the lack of such language in Article II is evidence of broader presidential
powers.48 Others, however, have argued that the enumerated powers in
Article II would be mere surplusage if they do not exclusively define the
extent of the President's powers.4 9
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,5" the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of inherent presidential powers and held that the
President's powers were not limitless. 5' In Youngstown, steel company
employees were preparing a strike that would shut down the country's

untenable legal position after another regarding the rule of law in the war against
terror.

... Those policies include this nominee's role in developing interpretation of
the law to justify harsh treatment of prisoners tantamount to torture.
Id. (testimony of Senator Patrick Leahy).
45. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
46. Id. at art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America."). The specific powers of the President are to act as commander in chief, to grant
reprieves and pardons, to make treaties, to nominate public ministers and judges of the Supreme
Court with the advice and consent of the Senate, and to grant commissions during the recess of the
Senate. Id. at art. II, § 2.
47. Id. at art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.").
48. Erwin Chemerinsky, ControllingInherentPresidentialPower:Providinga Framework
for JudicialReview, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 867-68 (1983) (citing Alexander Hamilton, The First
Letter of Pacificus (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 1 WILLIAM M. GOLDSMITH, THE GROWTH OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY 398, 401 (1974)).
49. Id. (citing James Madison, The First Letter of Helvidius (Aug.-Sept. 1793), reprintedin
GOLDSMITH, supranote 48, at 401).
50. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
51. Id. at 588-89 ("The Constitution did not subject this law-making power of Congress to
presidential or military supervision or control.... The Founders of this Nation entrusted the law
making power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times.").
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steel mills.52 President Truman,53 concerned that a strike would jeopardize
national security because steel was essential to manufacturing weapons
and other materials for war,54 issued an executive order that the Secretary
of Commerce take possession of the nation's steel mills to ensure their
continued operation.55 The steel companies obeyed the Secretary's orders
but brought proceedings against him.56
The Supreme Court addressed whether the President was acting within
his presidential powers when he issued the order.57 The Court stated that
presidential powers arise only from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution. 8 The Court found that there was no statute or act of
Congress that supported the seizure of the steel mills.59 The Court also
found that there was no express constitutional language that would allow
the order; specifically, the grant of executive power in Article II did not
authorize the order because the order was akin to lawmaking, and Article
I specifically reserves the lawmaking power for Congress.6'
Justice Jackson concurred with the majority and described a three-part
analysis of executive powers.6 ' Under his analysis, the President's power
would vary depending on the circumstances.62 First, Justice Jackson
reasoned that the President's authority is at its greatest when the President
acts pursuant to an express or implied act of Congress.63 Second, Justice
Jackson suggested that when there is no congressional act to support the
President's actions, the President may act only pursuant to his own
independent powers.' Finally, he argued that the President's powers are
at their lowest when the President acts in contradiction to the express or
implied will of Congress.65
While the Court in Youngstown definitively concluded that President
Truman could not issue an order to take possession of the steel mills, the
case did not state a clear rule to be applied in future cases. Many scholars
52. Id. at 582.
53. Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 871.
54. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 583.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 582.
58. Id. at 585.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 587-88 ("The Constitution did not subject this law-making power of Congress to
presidential or military supervision or control.").
61. Id. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
62. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Am. Fed'n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs.
v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784,787,796 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (distinguishing Youngstown because in this case
the President was acting pursuant to a direct grant of authority from Congress).
64. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
65. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
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have recognized that there are four possible approaches to interpreting
Youngstown:
(1) There is no inherent presidential power, and the President
may act only if there is express constitutional or statutory
authority.
(2) The President has inherent authority unless the President
interferes with the functioning of another branch of
government or usurps the powers of another branch.
(3) The President may exercise powers not mentioned in the
Constitution so long as the President does not violate a
statute or the Constitution.
(4) The President has inherent powers that may not be
restricted by Congress and may act unless the Constitution
is violated."
While each approach finds support in Youngstown, the approach taken can
have a dramatic impact on the outcome of a case.67
To further complicate the issue of inherent presidential powers, in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,6" the Court held that the
President's inherent powers are much greater in foreign affairs than they
are in domestic affairs.69 In Curtiss-Wright,the House of Representatives
and the Senate issued a joint resolution giving the President authority to
issue a proclamation making it a crime to sell "arms or munitions of war"
within the United States to the countries engaged in the Chaco conflict.70
The President in turn issued the proclamation, and the Supreme Court
reversed demurrers and remanded to the lower courts in light of the
President's proclamation.7 '
While the Supreme Court often has noted that the President's powers
are greater in the realm of foreign affairs or hostile relations than in the

66. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 331 (2d ed.
2002).
67. Chemerinsky, supranote 48, at 879-80. Chemerinsky demonstrates the importance of the
approach with an example. In the 1970's, President Nixon claimed the power to impound and thus
refused to spend funds appropriated by Congress. Id. at 879. Under the first approach, this would
be unconstitutional because there is no constitutional or statutory authority for this. Id. at 880.
Under the second approach, it also would be unconstitutional because it usurps Congress's spending
power. Id. Under the third approach, it would be constitutional so long as Congress had not adopted
legislation to the contrary. Id. Finally, under the fourth approach, it would be constitutional as an
inherent power, and any congressional act to the contrary would be an unconstitutional restraint on
the President. Id.
68. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
69. Id. at 319.
70. Id. at 312.
71. Id. at 312-13.
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realm of domestic affairs,72 it is significant that Justice Jackson's three-part
analysis in Youngstown seemingly applies even in these cases. As in
Curtiss-Wright, the President typically acts with acceptance from
Congress, or at least does not act against Congress. In Hamilton v. Dillin,"
for example, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that the President likely has
authority over hostile operations.74 Nevertheless, the Court did not decide
this issue and held only that it was clear that the President could act with
the concurrent authority of Congress.75
Similarly, in Haigv. Agee,7 6 the Supreme Court held that the President

could revoke a passport on the grounds that the passport holder was
involved in foreign activities that were a threat to the national security and
foreign relations of the United States.77 In this case, the President was
again acting with congressional approval.7" Also, in Department of the
Navy v. Egan,79 the Court upheld the Navy's decision to revoke security
clearance for the plaintiff.8" Again, the Court noted that, in the absence of
a congressional statement to the contrary, courts should avoid restraining
the President's power in military and national security affairs.8 ' In this
case, however, the Court again found congressional approval of the
executive's actions.8 2
Although the preceding cases all relate to foreign affairs, national
security, or hostile relations, the principle articulated in Justice Jackson's
concurrence in Youngstown remains true. 3 When the President acts with
the authority of Congress, his power is at its highest; when the President

72. Id. at 319 (quoting Justice Marshall's argument before the House of Representatives in
1800 stating, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations.").
73. 88 U.S. 73 (1875).
74. Id. at 87.
75. Id. at 88 ("But without pursuing this inquiry, and whatever view may be taken as to the
precise boundary between the legislative and executive powers in reference to the question under
consideration, there is no doubt that a concurrence of both affords ample foundation for any
regulations on the subject.").
76. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
77. Id. at 306-07.
78. Id. ("We hold that the policy announced in the challenged regulations is 'sufficiently
substantial and consistent' to compel the conclusion that Congress has approved it." (quoting Zemel
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965))).
79. 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
80. Id. at 520, 533-34.
81. Id. at 530.
82. Id. ("Finally, we are fortified in our conclusion when we consider generally the statute's
'express language' along with 'the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative
history, and the nature of the administrative action involved."' (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition
Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984))).
83. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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acts with silence from Congress, he acts only pursuant to his own
powers.84 Importantly, none of these cases stands for the proposition that
the President may act against Congress. 5 Other similar cases are
consistent with this trend. 6
IV. THE TORTURE MEMO ON PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
The Torture Memo analyzes 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A and their
application to defining permissible interrogation tactics outside the United
States.87 According to these statutes, it is a crime to commit or attempt to
commit torture outside of the United States. 8 In the Torture Memo, the
OLC begins by defining torture so narrowly that very few acts would
qualify as criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 2340A. 89 However, the OLC argues
in the alternative that if a particular act were to violate § 2340A, the statute
would be unconstitutional for interfering with the President's war
powers.9 °
In arguing for the President's broad powers as Commander in Chief,
the OLC began the section by discussing the war with al Qaeda and the
threat posed by potential future terror attacks.9" The OLC reasoned that
because al Qaeda continues to plan future attacks, it is necessary for
national security and defense that the United States capture and interrogate
the individuals involved in potential attacks.92

84. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
In Chevron, the Court wrote:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress ....
[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-44; see also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) (holding that the
Court would not consider the President as an "agency" under a statute for damages in the absence
of an explicit statement by Congress); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 22 1,
241 (1986) (holding that Congress intended to give the Secretary of Commerce discretion with
respect to international whaling quotas).
87. Torture Memo, supranote 7, at 1.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (2000).
89. See Torture Memo, supra note 7, at 1.
90. Id. at 31.
91. Id.at 31-33.
92. Id. at 33.
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Next, the OLC reasoned that 18 U.S.C. §2340A must be interpreted so
as to avoid constitutional problems.93 The OLC first claimed that the
President has complete discretion in exercising his power as Commander
in Chief.94 For this proposition, the OLC relied on Hamilton v. Dillin,
which the OLC quoted as saying, "it is 'the President alone [] who is
constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile operations."'95
Therefore, the OLC suggested that § 2340A should not be interpreted
as applying to interrogations conducted pursuant to the President's
authority as Commander in Chief.96 In its reasoning, the OLC also relied
on Departmentof the Navy v. Egan, where the Court held that it would not
assume that Congress intended to interfere with the President's authority
in military affairs and 97national security unless Congress specifically stated
its intention to do SO.
Beyond Egan, the OLC relied extensively on prior memoranda of the
OLC that stated that Congress lacks the authority to define how the
President may exercise his powers as Commander in Chief during
wartime. 98 Specifically, the OLC relied on a published OLC opinion
("Prosecution for Contempt" Memo) that asserted that a congressional
contempt statute could not be construed so as to apply to executive branch
officials who claim executive privilege in response to congressional
subpoenas. 99 The OLC reasoned that, like a contempt statute, § 2340A

93. Id. at 34.
94. Id. at 33.
95. Id. at 34 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S.
73, 87 (1875)).
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988)). The Court in Egan
wrote, "unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been
reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs."
Egan, 484 U.S. at 530.
98. Torture Memo, supra note 7, at 34-35 (citing Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to Daniel J.
Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs (Apr. 8,
2002) (regarding the Swift Justice Authorization Act); Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to Timothy E.
Flanigan, Deputy Counsel to the President (remainder of citation redacted in memo); Memorandum
from Richard L. Shiffrin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel, to Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs (Sept. 15, 1995)
(regarding the Defense Authorization Act)).
99. Id. at 35 (quoting Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official
Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 101, 134 (1984)). The
OLC opinion stated:
[11f executive officials were subject to prosecution for criminal contempt
whenever they carried out the President's claim of executive privilege, it would
significantly burden and immeasurably impair the President's ability to fulfill his
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would burden and impair the President in carrying out his powers if the
statute could criminalize actions taken by executive officials pursuant to
the President's Commander in Chief powers.'
Next, the OLC argued that even if §2340A were construed as applying
to executive officers acting pursuant to the President's Commander in
Chief powers, the Justice Department could not enforce only briefly §
2340A against those executive officers.'' The OLC supported this
proposition almost exclusively by citing to previous OLC opinions and
memoranda. 1 2 First, the OLC again relied on the "Prosecution For
Contempt" Memo, claiming that it had concluded therein that courts and
prosecutions against people acting pursuant to
prosecutors should reject 03
1
authority.
the President's
Second, the OLC relied on post-9/l1 OLC memoranda that broadly
defined the scope of the President's powers and reasoned that it was even
more crucial that courts and prosecutors reject prosecutions against people
acting pursuant to the President's Commander in Chief power." In
keeping with these memoranda, the OLC reasoned that as the Commander
in Chief, the President has a duty to protect the country; therefore, the
President must have all powers necessary to achieve that end.'0 5 Citing
only to a book on the status of prisoners of war, the OLC continued by
arguing that one of the main duties of a Commander in Chief is "capturing,
detaining, and interrogating members of the enemy."'0 6
constitutional duties. Therefore, the separation of powers principles that underlie
the doctrine of executive privilege also would preclude an application of the
contempt of Congress statute to punish officials for aiding the President in
asserting his constitutional privilege.
Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted A Claim
of Executive Privilege, supra, at 134.
100. Torture Memo, supranote 7, at 35.
101. Id. at 36.
102. Id. at 36-39. The OLC also cited Lichter v. UnitedStates, 334 U.S. 742, 782 (1948), and
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862), but these cases only indirectly support the
OLC's proposition. The OLC interprets Lichter to stand for the proposition that the distribution and
scope of powers must be construed so as to promote the most "efficacious defense of the nation."
Torture Memo, supra note 7, at 37. The OLC uses the Prize Cases to support the idea that the
President alone can decide whether his actions as Commander in Chief were appropriate and that
it is not for a court to decide such a political question. Id. at 38.
103. Torture Memo, supra note 7, at 36.
104. Id. (citing September 11 War Powers Memorandum: Memorandum from Patrick F.
Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Nov. 6, 2001) (regarding the legality of using
commissions to try terrorists)).
105. Id. at 38.
106. Id. (citing ALLAN ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR 59-80 (1976)
(describing the necessity of detaining enemy combatants and hostile civilians in modem conflicts)).
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On the issue of presidential powers, the OLC concluded that any effort
by Congress to limit the President in using his Commander in Chief
107
powers to interrogate battlefield combatants would be unconstitutional.
The OLC supported this conclusion by comparing interrogations to the
President's strategic and tactical decisions on the battlefield.'0 8 The OLC
wrote,
Congress can no more interfere with the President's conduct
of the interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate
strategic or tactical decisions on the battlefield. Just as
statutes that order the President to conduct warfare in a
certain manner or for specific goals would be
unconstitutional, so too are laws that seek to prevent the
President from gaining the intelligence he believes necessary
to prevent attacks upon the United States." 9
Therefore, the OLC concluded that if § 2340A could be construed to
criminalize action taken by the President as Commander in Chief, that
statute must be found unconstitutional and prosecutors and judges should
reject such prosecutions." 0
V.

THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Ethical conduct is often impossible to define because each individual
has his own sense of what is right and wrong and his own set of values that
will determine his actions when he is faced with competing ethical
concerns."' The Model Rules exist to ensure some level of uniformity in

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 31-39. The OLC wrote:
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the constitutional authority to order
interrogations of enemy combatants to gain intelligence information concerning
the military plans of the enemy. The demands of the commander in chief power
are especially pronounced in the middle of a war in which the nation has already
suffered a direct attack. In such a case, the information gained from interrogations
may prevent future attacks by foreign enemies. Any effort to apply Section 2340A
in a manner that interferes with the President's direction of such core war matters
as the detention and interrogation of enemy combatants thus would be
unconstitutional.

Id. at 31.
111. Some scholars argue, under a theory of ethical relativism, that what is right or wrong
varies for each person. The Markkula Center for Applied Ethics has defined ethical relativism as:
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the ethics that guide lawyers and to provide a model for states to set up
similar rules and corresponding avenues for disciplinary action in the event
that a lawyer strays from the Model Rules."'
Although the Model Rules attempt to provide a uniform moral compass
for lawyers to follow, its rules are often far from clear." 3 When a lawyer

the theory that holds that morality is relative to the norms of one's culture. That
is, whether an action is right or wrong depends on the moral norms of the society
in which it is practiced. The same action may be morally right in one society but
be morally wrong in another. For the ethical relativist, there are no universal
moral standards-standards that can be universally applied to all peoples at all
times.
Manuel Velasquez et al., Ethical Relativism (2004), available at http://www.scu.edu/ethics/
practicing/decision/ethicalrelativism.html. However, many scholars discount this theory, arguing
that there is a constant morality across all cultures and societies and that it is simply the means of
achieving the moral ends that may differ. Id. Regardless of the worth of the theory, the legal
profession requires a uniform ethical code that will bind lawyers in their relationships with clients
who are often in a vulnerable position. Such rules are essential to building the trust between a
lawyer and a client that is necessary for an effective fiduciary relationship. The Preamble to the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, a predecessor of the model rules, reads as follows:
In America, where the stability of Courts and of all departments of
government rests upon the approval of the people, it is peculiarly essential that the
system for establishing and dispensing Justice be developed to a high point of
efficiency and so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of its administration. The future of the Republic, to a
great extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied. It
cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our
profession are such as to merit the approval of all just men.
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Preamble (repealed 1970), cited in MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT prmbl. (2002).
9, 19 (2000).
112. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT prmbl.
113. See Paul D. Knothe & Amy Horowitz, Walking the Tightrope Between Advising and
Assisting Clients with Criminalor FraudulentConduct: Can the ABA Provide Better Guidance?,
15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 809, 824-25 (2002) (describing the confusion that existed in interpreting
Rule 1.2(d) before the Ethics 2000 revisions to the Model Rules and theorizing that this confusion
would be lessened if the proposed revisions were implemented). The ABA since has incorporated
the Ethics 2000 proposals into the Model Rules. Douglas K. Schnell, Note, Don't Just Hit Send:
UnsolicitedE-Mail and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 533, 540 (2004).
Nevertheless, uncertainty remains:
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party
is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and
at the same time assume that justice is being done. So also, a lawyer can be sure
that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest because
people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal
obligations, when they know their communications will be private.
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is faced with an ethical dilemma, the lawyer must read each rule in the
context of the entire Model Rules." 4 Even then, the lawyer's decision will
often have to strike a balance between two competing rules." 5 It is in
regard to striking this balance between conflicting rules that the Model
Rules is less than clear." 6 Therefore, where rules conflict, the desired
ethical uniformity of the Model Rules is often replaced with personal
ethics or the lack thereof." 7
Most lawyers will acknowledge that zealous advocacy is the very
essence of legal representation.' The comment to Rule 1.3 states:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client
despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to
the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are
required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer

MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT prmbl. 8 (2002). The Model Rules recognize that, in certain
cases, a lawyer's ethical obligations will conflict and that, in those cases, a lawyer will act
according to his own judgment and in a spirit compatible with the "principles underlying the
Rules." Id.at prmbl. 9.
114.
In the nature of law practice.., conflicting responsibilities are encountered.
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's
responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in
remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of
Professional Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within
the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional
discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive
professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the
Rules. These principles include the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and
pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while
maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons
involved in the legal system.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT prmbl. 9 (2002).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., Colorado v. Chappell, 927 P.2d 829, 829 (Colo. 1996) (describing a situation
where an attorney told her client that "as her attorney" she advised her to obey the court's
restraining order not to remove her child from Colorado but that "as a mother" she advised her to
run).
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2002); Sean J. Griffith, Afterword
and Comment: Towards an EthicalDuty to MarketInvestors, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1223, 1229 (2003)
("The principle of advocacy has become the fundamental norm informing the lawyer's role as well
as a guiding principle of legal ethics. A lawyer complies with her ethical duties primarily by
zealously advancing her clients' interests up to the limits of the law, narrowly defined.") (citing
Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-FirmLitigators:PreliminaryObservations,67
FoRDHAM L. REv. 709 (1998)).
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must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests
of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf."9
Zealous advocacy, however, is not the lawyer's only ethical duty. 20
Nevertheless, many scholars have discussed the recent trend of lawyers to
focus almost exclusively on their duty to represent their client zealously
and within the bounds of the law as narrowly defined. 12 1 However, the
comment to Rule 1.3 also makes clear that the lawyer's actions must be
lawful and ethical. 122 Therefore, a lawyer who follows Model Rule 1.3
without regard to other ethical rules likely will violate another provision
of the Model Rules.

119. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. I (2002).
120. Id. at prmbl. Also, as Sean Griffith has written:
In this Afterword and Comment, I argue that the model of the lawyer as a
zealous advocate has become so pervasive within legal ethics that ethical norms
no longer provide a significant constraint on a lawyer's conduct in the interests of
her client. Without a normative principle to act as a counterweight to the dictates
of zealous advocacy, legal ethics cannot provide any basis for a lawyer to resist
a client's goals. Legal ethics has thus failed to produce a normative principle
capable of constraining the conduct of business lawyers in the current corporate
scandals.
Griffith, supra note 118, at 1227.
121. E.g., Gordon, supranote 118, at 710 (describing the survey responses of big-firm lawyers
that reflected a belief that zealous advocacy was their primary ethical responsibility and that
zealous advocacy means doing everything they can for their clients within the limits of the rules);
Griffith, supra note 118, at 1228-29; see also ALAN M. DERSHOW1TZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE
O.J. SIMPSON CASE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 145 (1996) ("What a defense attorney
'may' do, he must do, if it is necessary to defend his client. A zealous defense attorney has a
professional obligation to take every legal and ethically permissible step that will serve the client's
best interest--even if the attorney finds the step personally distasteful."). Of the Pure Client Model,
Lord Brougham states:
"[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to
himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard
the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless
of consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in
confusion."
Ethical Abuse, supra note 1, at 1086 (quoting 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821), quoted in
MELLINKOFF, supranote 1, at 189).
122. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2002).
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One of the countervailing considerations to zealous advocacy within
the Model Rules is the proscription against assisting or counseling a client
in criminal or fraudulent conduct.'23 Model Rule 1.2(d) states:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences
of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may
counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
law. 124
The proscriptive aspect of this rule has two facets. First, a lawyer cannot
counsel a client to break the law.125 This aspect seems obvious on its face,
but this type of counseling can be subtler than explicitly telling a client to
break the law. A lawyer may not, for example, ask his client a leading
question that suggests what the correct126answer should be and thereby
encourage his client to commit perjury.
Second, a lawyer cannot assist a client in breaking the law. 27 Assisting
a client in breaking the law can take various forms. A somewhat obvious
example of assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent activity may be a
lawyer who effects a fraudulent transfer on the client's behalf or who
makes a false certification to a third party on the client's behalf. However,
assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent activity may occur more subtly.
For example, a lawyer who inappropriately counsels his client under the
first part of the rule also may be inappropriately assisting his client to the
extent that the lawyer's advice provides the client with the legal defense
of reliance on counsel's advice. 28 It is important to note that a lawyer may

123. Id. at R. 1.2(d).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Cf In re Sieg, 515 N.W.2d 694, 699 (Wis. 1994) (holding that a lawyer did not violate
the rules of professional conduct when the lawyer advised his client to obtain a signed statement
from the client's brother certifying that the client had permission to use the brother's name even
though the client then fraudulently created and signed a statement to that effect).
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
128. Reliance on the advice of counsel is a defense to specific intent crimes. State v. Jacobson,
681 N.W.2d 398, 404 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). Although reliance on advice of counsel is not an
absolute defense, it is relevant to the defendant's intent when that intent is an element of the crime
charged. Id.; see also 52 AM. JUR. 2d Malicious Prosecution § 100 (2004). The section states:
Acting on the advice of counsel is sometimes treated as an affirmative defense
to a claim for malicious prosecution, and sometimes as simply negating either the
lack of probable cause or malice. In any case, the defendant is saved from liability
for malicious prosecution if he or she consulted with an attorney in good faith,
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have assisted or counseled his client in criminal activity under
129 the rule
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crime
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Model Rule 1.2(d) not only defines what a lawyer cannot do, but it also
attempts to clarify this prohibition by defining what a lawyer can do. The
latter part of Model Rule 1.2(d) makes clear that a lawyer does not violate
the rule simply by discussing the consequences of a client's proposed
conduct. 3 ' Unfortunately, these latter aspects of 1Model Rule 1.2(d) may
further confuse the lawyer's competing interests. 31
Model Rule 3.1 also limits a lawyer to bringing or defending
proceedings or arguing issues therein only in cases where the lawyer has
"a basis in law and fact" for making an argument. 132 The rule makes clear
that a lawyer is not prohibited from arguing for an extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law so long as the lawyer has a good faith basis for
doing so.133 This provision is consistent with Model Rule 1.3, which
requires zealous advocacy. 34 So long as a lawyer can make a good faith
argument on behalf of the client, she should do so. The comments to

gave him or her a full disclosure of the relevant facts, and acted on the attorney's
advice in good faith in initiating or continuing the action.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
129. See supra note 34.
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
131. See EthicalAbuse,supranote 1. There, the author proposed a hypothetical situation based
on Bronston v. United States where the client gave an evasive answer on cross-examination. Id. at
1082-83. The client's answer was not an outright lie (and the Supreme Court found that it was not
perjury), but the client's answer was misleading through negative implication. Id. at 1083. The
author agreed that the client's response was not perjury but questioned whether the lawyer would
have been ethical if he had advised the client to answer evasively. Id.The author notes the
difference between what a lawyer can do in prospectively advising his client to act in a morally
questionable way and what a lawyer can do in retrospectively defending his client for engaging in
morally questionable conduct. Id. at 1084. The author noted:
[A] lawyer may enable future client conduct by describing the relevant legal
boundaries without actually encouraging misbehavior. Bronston's lawyer could
explain that a misleading but truthful answer is not perjury without actually telling
Bronston how he should testify....
... If the lawyer's description of options is sufficient such that the client really
understands each alternative, the client will pick the option with the best
consequences, even without the lawyer saying "I think you should do X."

Id. at 1088-89. Thus, by discussing the consequences of a client's proposed conduct, the lawyer
actually may enable the client to avoid those consequences illegally. Therefore, the line between
assisting and describing consequences may not always be clear.
132. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002).
133. Id.
134. See id. at R. 1.3.
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Model Rule 3.1 state that "[s]uch action is not frivolous even though the
lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail."' 35
Therefore, where the law is unclear, the lawyer is not restricted to arguing
the most probable interpretation; rather, he may argue any good faith
interpretation that would support his client's case.
It is noteworthy, however, that Model Rule 3.1 appears in the section
of the Model Rules on advocacy (Article 3). There is no corresponding
provision in the section of the Model Rules on counseling (Article 2). In
Article 2, Model Rule 2.1 requires that a lawyer use "independent
professional judgment and render candid advice."' 36 There is no statement
that a lawyer can advise his client on any nonfrivolous interpretation of the
law even if that interpretation is not the most probable interpretation. It is
likely that the absence of such a provision in Article 2 means that the
lawyer may not advise his client prospectively on an improbable
interpretation of the law in the same way that the same lawyer may argue
retrospectively an improbable interpretation to the court.
VI. A WRONG DEFINITION OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS: ASSISTING
OR COUNSELING IN CRIMINAL CONDUCT

A. Introduction
While the Model Rules attempt to create bright-line rules for lawyers
to follow in their daily lives, this Note recognizes that the rules are often
far from bright. Surely the lawyers who wrote the Torture Memo can and
have argued that the memo was only an analytical document and was not
intended to provide advice on the use of any particular type of torture.' 37
They can argue that their memo stated a plausible interpretation of the law
on presidential powers (though perhaps not the most popular
interpretation).' 38 They also can argue that potential defenses are part of
the relevant law and therefore within their duty to advise. Nevertheless, the
Torture Memo does not seem to comply with the spirit of the rules. The
problem may be that the memo is a result of an overly-literal reading of
the Model Rules that ignores the Model Rules' underlying principles, or
it may be a result of ethical rules that need to be clarified.' 39 In either case,

135. Id. R. 3.1 cmt. 2.
136. Id. at R. 2.1.
137. Allen & Priest, supra note 20 ("The memo was not prepared to provide advice on specific
methods or techniques .... It was analytical." (quoting Scott McClellan, White House Press
Secretary)).
138. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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the Torture Memo and the torture that it justifies"' are the best examples
of the magnitude of the problem.
B. The Advice on PresidentialPowers: CriminalCounseling
The Torture Memo presents a plausible interpretation of presidential
powers. It.may even be an interpretation that would be properly presented
in court as a defense if the President were prosecuted under § 2340A.'
The law is not nearly as clear, however, as the OLC makes it out to be. The
OLC presents highly debatable concepts in a highly argumentative and
persuasive manner that is unusual in a memorandum from a lawyer to his
client.' 42 The OLC also relies heavily on prior OLC opinions rather than
on actual case law.' 43 Finally, the OLC distorts the case law it presents in
order to support its ultimate conclusion that the President has broad power
in his role as Commander in Chief that cannot be limited by Congress."'
The OLC cites several cases for the proposition that the President has
broad powers in foreign affairs and national security.'45 The OLC then
argues that Congress cannot interfere with these powers.'46 What the OLC
neglects to mention, however, is that each of the cases it refers to involves
a President who is acting pursuant to the authority of Congress or, at a
minimum, who is not acting against Congress.' 4 7 The OLC never once
acknowledges Youngstown, where Justice Jackson in his concurrence made
clear that the President's authority is at its lowest when he acts against
Congress.'48
While the OLC argued that § 2340A did not specifically purport to
control the President, it did not specify that this conclusion was also
essential to a finding that the President had the power to conduct
interrogations that involve "torture." As an initial matter, the OLC argued

140. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
141. Although, arguably, even if the OLC lawyers presented this argument in court, they
would risk violating their ethical obligation under Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) to provide competent
advice. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2002). Where as here, however, the
lawyer is merely counseling the client (and not advocating for the client), the duty to disclose
contrary authority is even greater.
142. See supra notes 87-110 and accompanying text. Although the OLC and the President do
not share a typical lawyer-client relationship, see supra Part II, the Note will refer to the President
as the OLC's client because part of the OLC's role is to advise the President. See supranotes 39-40.
143. See supra notes 99, 102 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
145. Torture Memo, supra note 7, at 33-35.
146. Id. at 38.
147. See supra notes 94, 97 and accompanying text; cf supra notes 73-75, 79-82 and
accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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that § 2340A did not control the President.'49 The OLC then argued in the
alternative that if § 2340A did control the President, it was
unconstitutional as interfering with the President's powers as Commander
in Chief. 5 ° This ignores the case law that the OLC relies on, none of which
supports the idea that the President can act against Congress's stated
intent. 151
Arguably, the OLC's advice is a violation of Model Rule 1.2(d) in that
it involves counseling a client in criminal activity. 5 2 First, many lawyers
have argued that the OLC's interpretation of presidential powers is
wrong.' 53 Under that approach, although the OLC did not actually advise
the President on what types of interrogation techniques to use, it advised
the President that he could disregard a criminal statute.
Alternatively, even if § 2340A arguably would not control the
President, it is not clear that it is ethical to advise the President to
participate in activity that would be criminal but for his "power" as
President. Rule 1.2(d) states that a lawyer cannot counsel his client to
participate in criminal activity, but it does not define criminal activity.154
It is clear under §§ 2340, 2340A that torture is criminal. 1' Whether or not
Congress has power over the President in this regard, torture is still
criminal. Therefore, regardless of the President's powers, his lawyers
should not advise him to allow torture in interrogations.
This argument is a bit of a stretch under the Model Rules given that
"criminal" is not defined and that it could easily be argued that if the
President has the power to conduct torture, then torture is not illegal.
Nevertheless, former OLC attorneys have recognized a duty to do more
than merely advise the President on how to avoid criminal sanctions. In
their Guide, the lawyers wrote:
OLC always should be mindful that the President's legal
obligations are not limited to those that are judicially
enforceable.... An OLC approach that instead would equate
"lawful" with "likely to escape judicial condemnation" would
ill serve the President's constitutional duty by failing to
describe all legal constraints and by appearing to condone
unlawful action as long as the President could, in a sense, get
away with it.'56

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Torture Memo, supra note 7, at 36.
Id. at 31, 39.
See id. at 37-38; supra notes 94, 97 and accompanying text.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000).
Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel (Dec. 21, 2004), at 2, available at
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This statement by the former OLC attorneys reveals a recognition that
even where a President could "get away with" a particular course of
action, it may be unethical for an OLC attorney to advise the President to
pursue that course of action if the action would otherwise be unlawful.
C. Covering the Client: Subtle Assistance
The unbalanced and one-sided advice of the OLC is more than an
analysis of the law-it is advocacy. One must wonder why the OLC was
motivated to advise its client so adamantly on an area of the law that is far
from clear. While it is not simple to determine what the OLC's intent was
in writing the memo, a possible motivation would be to "cover" the
President.157 The OLC could cover the President in two ways. First, by
writing the memo, the OLC provided the President with the defense of
reliance on advice of counsel.158 Second, by writing the memo, the OLC
ensured that the entire federal government, including the Department of
Justice, would act according to the OLC's analysis,159 thereby ensuring that
the DOJ would not prosecute the President. If cover were in fact the
OLC's 16motivation,
this would be a form of "assistance" under Rule
0
1.2(d).

http://www.acslaw.org/OLCGuidelinesMemo.pdf [hereinafter The Guide].
157. See, e.g., Hilden, supra note 20 (discussing another recent OLC memorandum). Hilden
wrote:
What [Yoo's] memo added-as he was doubtless aware-was cover. It provides
cover for the administration, in the event there are future attempts to prosecute
administration members for war crimes. In such proceedings, he doubtless
anticipated that advice of counsel could either be used as a formal defense, or at
the very least, a persuasive point in favor of the defense: "My lawyer told me it
was legal."
Id. The Guide also seems to recognize the possibility of providing cover when it suggests that the
OLC should follow only the advocacy model of lawyering when the OLC specifically states that
its opinion is not to be binding on the executive branch. The Guide, supra note 156, at 6.
158. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
159. Allen & Priest, supra note 20 ("Unlike documents signed by deputies in the Office of
Legal Counsel, which are generally considered by federal agencies as advice, a memorandum
written by the head of the office is considered akin to a legally binding document, said another
former Office of Legal Counsel Lawyer."); Priest, supra note 13 ("Bybee's signature gives the
document additional authority, making it akin to a binding legal opinion on government policy on
interrogations.").
160. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
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Reliance on advice of counsel can serve to negate a showing of specific
intent where that is an element of the charged crime.' 61 The OLC itself
mentioned this possibility in its memo. The OLC wrote,
A defendant could negate a showing of specific intent to
cause severe mental pain or suffering by showing that he had
acted in good faith that his conduct would not amount to the
acts prohibited by the statute. Thus, if a defendant has a good
faith belief that his actions will not result in prolonged mental
harm, he lacks the mental state necessary for his actions to
constitute torture. A defendant could show that he acted in
good faith by taking such steps as surveying professional
literature, consulting with experts, or reviewing evidence
gained from past experience."'
If the OLC knew that it was providing cover for the President to conduct
torture in interrogations, this would convert the OLC's advice into more
1 63
than "counseling" under Rule 1.2(d); it would constitute "assistance.
Lawyers at the OLC are unique in the ways by which they can "assist"
their client because they have more power and influence than most
lawyers. OLC memoranda signed by the Assistant Attorney General have
the force of binding legal precedent in that the entire executive branch is
bound to act by them. This means that, while the Torture Memo was in
effect between August 2002 and June 2004, the Department of Justice
would have rejected the opportunity to prosecute the President under
§ 2340A. The OLC says as much in its discussion of presidential powers.
It wrote,
[W]e conclude that the Department of Justice could not could
not [sic] enforce Section 2340A against federal officials
acting pursuant to the President's constitutional authority to
wage a military campaign.
Indeed, in a different context, we have concluded that both
courts and prosecutors should reject prosecutions that apply
federal criminal laws to activity that is authorized pursuant to
one of the President's constitutional powers .... Further, we
concluded that the Department of Justice could not bring a
criminal prosecution against a defendant who had acted

161. Gregory E. Maggs, Consumer Bankruptcy Fraud and the "Reliance on Advice of
Counsel" Argument, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 8 (1995).
162. Torture Memo, supranote 7, at 8.
163. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

27

Florida Law Review,
Vol. LA
57,
Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 4
FLORIDA
W REVIEW

[Vol. 57

pursuant to an exercise of the President's constitutional
power.

Although the memoranda of most lawyers to their clients do not carry this
sort of authority, OLC memoranda clearly do. Therefore, OLC lawyers
must have additional ethical concerns. Because of the OLC's dual role in
advising the President and setting policy for the Department of Justice,
prospectively advocating for their client may involve assisting that client
to evade prosecution.
VII. SUGGESTIONS

A. Introduction
If the Torture Memo is an example of assisting or counseling a client
in criminal activity, as this Note has suggested, it is hard to imagine
another example with greater potential consequences. The OLC's
influence on the federal government means that its advice not only
encouraged torture but also ensured that the President would not be
prosecuted for it. Given the magnitude of this problem, it is important to
explore possible solutions.'65
B. More Definite EthicalRules
As described above, the Model Rules are often far from clear.'66 For
example, while a lawyer can make any nonfrivolous argument in court in
defense of his client, it is not clear that the same standard applies to advice
given prospectively to a client.'67 For a client to make an informed
decision, he must know more than the merely "nonfrivolous" argument in
his defense.'68 The client must know the "majority" legal opinion on his
issue and be made aware of any significant split of authority. For a lawyer
to argue a minority viewpoint to his client in the same way as he would to
a court is to deprive the client of a full understanding of the law.

164. Torture Memo, supra note 7, at 36.
165. On the broader issue of torture, Congress has taken some action to rectify the problem.
See Smith, supranote 8. Smith described a measure approved by the Senate that would limit U.S.
interrogation techniques to those that the United States would consider legal for other countries to
use. Id.
166. See supranotes 113-14 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 131.
168. The Guide, supra note 156, at 2 ("OLC should not simply provide an advocate's best
defense to contemplated action that OLC actually believes is best viewed as unlawful.").
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Currently, Model Rule 3.1 on Meritorious Claims and Contentions is
in Article 3, which covers rules of advocacy. 169 Although Model Rule 2.1,
which is in Article 2 on counseling, defines the role of the lawyer as an
advisor, it does not instruct the lawyer in a way that corresponds to Model
Rule 3.1.170 The ambiguity could be resolved by inserting a provision on
prospective counseling in Article 2 that corresponds to the provision on
retrospective advocacy in Model Rule 3.1.
It also is noteworthy that nowhere do the Model Rules provide "cover"
for the client. While it may be obvious under Model Rule 1.2(d) that a
lawyer cannot intentionally provide bad advice for the purpose of
providing his client with the defense of reliance on counsel's advice, an
explicit statement to that effect would be helpful. As the rules stand,
without the previous clarification suggested in this Note, a lawyer could
provide nonfrivolous but one-sided advice advocating a minority
viewpoint on the law that not only would provide his client with cover but
also would allow the lawyer to avoid charges of misconduct. While the
question of providing cover may largely be one of intent that is difficult to
prove, it may be helpful to add an express provision in the comments to
Model Rule 1.2(d) that makes clear that a lawyer who gives advice as
cover is "assisting" under the rule.
C. ProfessionalIndependence
While clearer ethical rules would be helpful, the specific problem
outlined in this Note may better be solved by implementing a structure of
professional independence in the OLC. As discussed above, the OLC and
the Attorney General, in theory, act independently from the Executive. 1 '
In reality, however, this is often far from true. RandolfD. Moss discusses
two models to interpreting the role of OLC: 1) the executive branch lawyer
as advocate; and 2) the executive branch lawyer as judge.' 72 Moss
concludes, however, that the approach is not so simple as to be able to
choose one model over the other.173 Rather, the OLC's role is a

combination of the two models. Moss describes it as follows:
Unlike a court, the executive branch lawyer is part of an
administration that is accountable to the People and should
thus strive, within the bounds of the best view of the law, to
achieve its policy goals. He or she should do so with due
respect not only for relevant judicial precedent, but also for
169. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002).

170.
171.
172.
173.

See id. at R. 2.1, R. 3.1.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
Moss, supranote 36, at 1305-06.
Id. at 1330.
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the tradition of the executive branch legal interpretation and
the substantial body of non-judicial precedent that informs
that process. In the end, because the law is by its very nature
supreme, the best view of the law must trump other
interests. 174
Therefore, the OLC's role involves competing interests of supporting the
President's policy concerns and neutrally analyzing the law.
The dual role of the OLC is comparable to the dual roles of the lawyers
involved in the Enron collapse. There, the lawyers acted both as
"transaction engineers" and as "gatekeepers."' 175 As Griffith described it,
the lawyers were responsible for both setting up transactions for their
clients and then certifying the validity of those transactions to third
parties.76 Griffith compared this to the dual role of accountants as
consultant and auditors. 17 "When, as gatekeepers, lawyers certify the legal
compliance of transactions they have engineered,
they are passing
178
judgment on beasts of their own creation.'
In both cases, the dual-role lawyer risks assisting in criminal or
fraudulent activity if he is overly zealous in protecting the interests of his
client. As Griffith explained,
[T]he advocacy principle... was the precise problem in...
Enron .... [G]atekeepers became advocates, and the test of
whether a transaction was acceptable was not whether it made
sense in some larger scheme of corporate conduct but
whether it was narrowly legal. As long as the transaction met
certain minimum requirements,
it seemed, the gatekeepers
79
were willing to let it pass.
A dual-role lawyer, therefore, must remain mindful of his duty of
neutrality. This, however, may be too much to ask of lawyers, particularly
lawyers working under the powerful eye of the President, trained as
advocates. 80 Not only is the President the supervisor of the entire
executive branch, including the OLC, but the President also has the power

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
concerns
Attorney
House).

Id.
Griffith, supranote 118, at 1225.
Id. at 1224-25.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
Id. at 1229-30.
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing Senator Patrick Leahy's
about whether Alberto Gonzales would be able to remain neutral if he were confirmed as
General despite his long-time friendship with President Bush and others in the White
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to appoint federal judges "with the advice and consent of the Senate."1' 1
These may seem to be two independent issues, but they are not when you
consider that Justice Scalia and Justice Rehnquist were both former
Assistant Attorneys General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel" 2
and that Jay S. Bybee, the signatory of the Torture Memo, is now
a judge
83
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
An independent OLC would alleviate the professional responsibility
problems demonstrated by the Torture Memo in two ways. First, if the
President had independent advice, his lawyer would be able to advise him
truthfully and fully on the law without fear that an interpretation of the law
could be binding against his client. Second, if the Attorney General did not
have a lawyer-client relationship with the President, he could issue
opinions with only one concern-the law. The outcome of this separation
of roles would benefit everyone. The executive branch as a whole would
receive legal policy that is consistent with the law, and the President would
receive legal advice that protects his interests as a client. Perhaps most
importantly, if the President did not follow the law, the Department of
Justice would be free to investigate because any legal advice given to the
President would not be binding on the entire executive branch. This
approach would most effectively advance the principles behind the Model
Rules-the obligation to "zealously

. .

.protect and pursue a client's

legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law.""'
As it stands today, the Torture Memo and its possible connection to
recent abuses, such as the atrocities at Abu Ghraib, have made clear that
something must change. On December 21, 2004, several former OLC
attorneys issued a document entitled, "Principles to Guide the Office of
Legal Counsel."' 5 While this document does not call for a drastic change
in the structure of the OLC within the executive branch, the document, if
followed, will be the first step in rectifying the problem demonstrated by
the Torture Memo. The Guide recognizes that the OLC "serves both the
institution of the presidency and a particular incumbent," but it suggests
that the OLC should avoid an "advocacy model" because such a model

181. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Robert G. Vaughn, Normative ControversiesUnderlying
ContemporaryDebatesAbout Civil JusticeReform: A Way of Talking About Bureaucracyand the
Future of the FederalCourts, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 217, 265 (1998).
182. Oyez, Antonin Scalia Background, at http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/legaientity/
103/background; Oyez, William H.Rehnquist Background,athttp://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/
legalentity/1 00/background.
183. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
184. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 9 (2002).
185. See generally The Guide, supra note 156 (offering suggestions on how the OLC should
operate by avoiding a purely advocacy-based model of lawyering).
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"inadequately promotes the President's constitutional obligation to ensure
the legality of executive action. '8 6
VIII. CONCLUSION

This Note has shown that the OLC, in its Torture Memo, strayed from
accepted legal principles in advising the President on his power to use
torture. In giving this one-sided advice, lawyers in the OLC may be in
violation of ethical standards as stated in the Model Rules. The arguments
made in the Torture Memo make clear that something is astray. It would
be easy to blame the Torture Memo on its author or its signatory and say
that they have violated their duty to the American people by focusing
solely on their allegiance to the President. But perhaps the problem is not
just a few bad apples. The problem may run deeper and may require a
rethinking of the role of the OLC such that its lawyers would not find
themselves with conflicting interests every time the President seeks advice
on questionable policy. When considering the proper role of the OLC in
the future, the OLC should be guided by the principles of the Model Rules
and should remember that its primary duty is to help the President uphold
the Constitution.8 7 In that regard it should never feel conflicted.

186. Id. at 1, 3. The Guide recognizes that there are instances where the OLC may "employ
advocacy-based modes of analysis," such as when it defends an act of Congress. Id. at 6. The Guide
insists, however, that in these cases the OLC should make clear that it is not acting in its "typical
role as the source of legal determinations that are binding within the executive branch." Id.
187. Id. at 1.
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